In May this
year I had an article with the above title published in the journal Global
Peace, Change and Security (formerly Pacifica), Volume 26, Issue 3, 2014. It
was posted by Taylor and Francis Online on 27 May 2014 (see here).
For a while it was available for free download but accessing it now requires
the payment of $US 39.
This is the
abstract:
This article examines the background to
the March 2003 invasion of Iraq with a view to identifying when and by what
process Australia committed itself to the invasion. It provides evidence and
assessments from a variety of sources that the Australian Government was effectively
committed long before it announced a decision on 18 March 2003, the eve of the
invasion. Many questions about the decision making process remain; in the
absence of a properly constituted inquiry there is little solid evidence that
the Government considered the matter of entering into armed hostilities with
the diligence that the Australian public might expect. It is the thesis of this
paper that one of the key lessons from the Iraq War is that the current system
of decision making in relation to the deployment of the Australian Defence
Force (ADF) into international armed conflict contains insufficient checks and
balances, and needs to be changed.
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