Future submarine: why the design competition?

In Defence industry: delays are costly I commented on the high cost to both defence industry and Defence itself of delays in the issuing of Requests for Tender (RFT) and changes in capability acquisition plans, and gave some examples. The future submarine project SEA 1000 might be about to throw up another example of an exercise that will be costly to industry without yielding any benefit to the Department of Defence.

On 27 October 2008 the Minister for Defence announced that he had approved funding of $4.67 million for a program of studies in support of the acquisition of Australia’s future submarines (the project now known as SEA 1000).

This project is of central importance to Australia’s future defence posture. Press commentary indicates that the forthcoming White Paper is likely to propose the acquisition of a fleet of twelve next-generation submarines to replace the current fleet of six Collins Class submarines when they begin to be withdrawn from service from 2025, and Professor Hugh White, the principal author of the 2000 Defence White Paper, has proposed a fleet of eighteen in his recent paper for the Lowy Institute.

Further, there is press commentary to the effect that submarine design and maintenance is to be one of the core industrial capabilities to be sustained in Australia. This is as it should be. With any front line platform the possession of the platform without the capacity to maintain and upgrade it makes it a capability of doubtful worth, but there are particular considerations that apply to our submarine fleet.

First, our submarines are unique. Second, the requirements of successful submarine warfare are so demanding that any submarine is a work in progress throughout its life. Technological development is always presenting the submarine fleet with new challenges (more capable anti-submarine warfare) and opportunities to improve the capability and self-defence characteristics of the submarine.

In his October media release the Defence Minister stated:

- Defence will engage industry to assist development of the project acquisition strategy for Government consideration in the second half of 2009

- Work on the concept design of the future submarine will commence in 2010, following which

- There will be further consideration by Government in 2010.

As I understand it the current thinking of Defence is to select two European submarine designers to engage in a Defence-funded competitive design development.

This strikes me as a redundant step which will waste time and money we do not have, as well as imposing on the goodwill of European submarine builders whose involvement we will need in due course.

There is only one sensible strategy for the development of Australia’s future submarine and that is to establish an Australian design team and get on with it. The reasons for this include:

- Our submarines are unique, for good reason. They are the only diesel electric submarines that are required to undertake long transits in order to reach their area of operation. All other long-range submarines (U.S., Russian, Chinese, British, French) are nuclear powered. European submarines patrol close to their home base.

- No-one starts designing a submarine from a clean sheet of paper: our future submarine will take as its starting point an existing design.

- The design of our long-range submarines cannot be based upon any of the nuclear designs. Design and operation of diesel electric submarines is all about energy management. With a nuclear reactor on board, energy management is not an issue, so there is a completely different design philosophy.

- As we found in the development of the Collins project, no European design comes close to our requirements.

- We need both European and United States technology in our next generation submarine:

: Europeans have the design skills for quiet operation at low speed, and the experience of design and operation of diesel electric submarines.

: The United States has the skills to make submarines quiet at transit speeds, and we must make our submarines inter-operable with United States naval assets.

- The Defence Materiel Organisation has already acknowledged here that the project will incorporate a mix of European, Australian and United States technology.

- It is almost certain that the United States will not release its sensitive technologies to a European designer for incorporation into their designs. Submarine technologies are amongst the most sensitive military technologies of all, and the U.S. Navy will rightly be concerned to ensure that there can be no leakage of their technology to any of the European submarine builders.

It follows that the only sensible starting point for Australia’s next generation submarine is the Collins Class, and everyone knows it. The relevant knowledge and skills are here and should remain so.

It is to be hoped that the next time the Government considers this project it will decide to cut to the chase and announce that this will be an Australian designed and built submarine, incorporating the best of European and United States technology, but selected, managed and integrated by us.

Aussie Observer Roundup 19 April

The Australian Observer blog seeks to contribute to public debate on a variety of themes – Defence, the Middle East, especially the triangular relationship between Iran, the United States and Israel, nuclear proliferation, climate change, trade and investment and public administration. It aims to keep readers in touch with the varied research of Australia 21 as that body pursues the answers to complex questions that are important to Australia’s future. From time to time it points readers in the direction of some of the things that make life worth living, and seeks to introduce readers in an accessible way to the mysterious world of modern physics, by pointing the way to articles written for the lay reader by leading researchers.

Here is a roundup of recent posts, and some thematic material that might be of interest to readers.

Most recently, in Afghanistan: can we win? there is an examination of conflicting views about the way forward in Afghanistan, and a response to an earlier post by Henry Thornton’s friend Sir Wellington Boote.

Continuing with the Middle East theme, there is an examination of the feasibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, in response to a military attack or other provocation, and thereby taking 25% of the world’s oil off the market. We hope that relations with Iran are sailing into calmer waters, but Henry it is always wise to consider the downside risks. Read all about it at Choke point: the Strait of Hormuz.

This post follows on from earlier Iran-related material including Dr Khatami at AIIA Victoria, a detailed account of an address by the former President of Iran, Dr Mohammad Khatami, during his recent visit to Melbourne, and his answers to questions; Iran: Obama, Brown and Rudd, an analysis of recent comments about Iran by the three leaders in question, an analysis which suggests that Prime Minister Rudd might be in danger of being left behind by President Obama; and Hillary's envoy: not everyone is cheering, which questions whether Dennis Ross is the right man to represent the United States to Iran.

On a matter of high current interest, Asylum seekers: how should we respond? suggests an appropriate way of approaching this issue and rehearses a little bit of history.

On the Defence theme, there are several posts that raise issues that are relevant to the forthcoming Defence White Paper. Is China really the enemy? suggests that the rise of China is benign for Australia but that we need to spend a lot more on defence. Debt and sovereignty: another issue for the White Paper notes that Vladimir Putin sees high levels of debt as undermining national sovereignty and suggests that this is an issue that Western political leaders need to think about. Climate change and nuclear proliferation joins up some of the dots between the global requirement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the likely growth we will see in the nuclear electric power industry worldwide. It notes that we will be living in a much more nuclear-capable region and suggests that this is an issue that also needs to be addressed in the context of the Defence White Paper.

At Managing the submarine workforce there is a commentary on the recent Submarine Workforce Sustainability Review and the Navy’s response, and a suggested approach to the development of the workforce that will be required for the successor to the Collins Class submarine.

Defence: understanding the diarchy explains the relationship between the Defence Secretary and the CDF; the accountability of Defence explains the public accountability framework within which Defence operates, and the structural reasons for cost over-runs on major defence equipment purchases.

On the theme of Chinese investment in Australia State-owned is not the main problem sets out some reasons why the Treasurer should decline Chinalco’s application to increase its stake in Rio Tinto, reasons which have nothing to do with the fact that Chinalco is a state-owned corporation. China: why Channar was different sets out some of the history of the 1980s Chinese investment in the Mount Channar iron ore mine, and notes some important differences between that investment and the Chinalco proposal which is currently under consideration.

There are now two items on the physics theme, Physics: Dark energy - does it really exist? and Physics: Naked singularities which address in an accessible way two of the most intriguing questions of modern astrophysics.

Finally, for those with an interest in the arts, we introduce The Alex Buzo Company, founded by the daughter of the noted Australian playwright to produce, promote and perpetuate his work. Yehudiana: Reliving the Menuhin Oddysey introduces an outstanding new biography of one of the great musical figures of the twentieth century, and Benefit concert for violinist Ignatius Kim gives notice of a benefit concert and fundraising program for an outstanding young Australian music student who sustained serious injuries as a result of being knocked off his pushbike by a hit-and-run driver.

Afghanistan: can we win?

I am indebted to Henry Thornton’s friend Sir Wellington Boote for drawing attention here on 14 April to an article in the U.S. Armed Forces Journal by Major Daniel L. Davis, entitled The Afghan Mistake: Why sending more troops won’t work.

Major Davis, who is a U.S. Army officer currently posted to Baghdad as a military trainer, asks whether a surge of troops in Afghanistan is the best solution to the deteriorating situation, and whether it is possible to create a stable government in Afghanistan by using military force to destroy all opposition (the Taliban and others).

In reply he argues that there are cultural reasons why increases in U.S. troop strength have only resulted in “increasing the number of American casualties, an escalating Afghan casualty rate and a troubling rise in Taliban strength and effectiveness”.

The particular feature of Afghan culture to which he refers is the qawm, a flexible sense of solidarity, sometimes translated as tribe, which may be based on kinship, residence or occupation. The qawm, which is the basic unit of community in Afghanistan, can cross tribal or even ethnic boundaries.

Davis argues that the qawm culture ensures that outsiders will always be treated as outsiders, such that Afghan parties who are fighting each other will band together to turn on the outsider.

His solution is to withdraw the bulk of all combat forces from Afghanistan, and “transition the nature of our support to something that is culturally acceptable and at least has a chance to be sustained over time”. He envisages an emphasis on institution building and changing the focus of foreign forces to a support and training role.

He distinguishes between domestic threats (the Taliban, provincial warlords) and transnational threats (al-Qaida). When transnational threats are identified American and NATO special forces would be mobilised along with American strategic assets to destroy them.

Much of this makes sense to me, but a better answer might lie in the views attributed to Dr David Kilcullen in an article in The Age of 18 April 2009. Kilcullen is a former Australian Army Lieutenant-Colonel who left the Army in 2005 to become Chief Strategist in the U.S. Office of the Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism (2005-2006), served in Iraq in the civilian position of Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser to General David Petraeus during 2007, was then an adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and at the end of 2008 joined the Washington-based consulting firm the Crumpton Group.

Kilcullen sees a lot of local insurgents as “accidental guerrillas”, people who have taken up arms because we have invaded them, not because they want to invade us:

He is fighting because we are in his space, not because he wished to invade ours. He is engaged in ‘resistance’ rather than ‘insurgency’ and he fights principally to be left alone.

Kilcullen, who has also advised the Obama Administration on the new “AfPak” policy under which an additional 26,000 troops will be sent to Afghanistan, says that the primary task of these troops must be the protection of population centres, not “chasing the enemy all over the place on large-scale search-and-destroy missions”. This will allow people to get on with their lives while Afghan security forces, backed by small teams of U.S. special forces, secure the areas between the population centres.

Kilcullen is suitably sober about the prospects of success:

The conflict remains winnable, but the overall trend is extremely negative and a concerted long-term effort is needed – lasting 5-10 years at least – if we are to have any chance of building a resilient Afghan state and the kind of civil society that can defeat the threat.

Extending an effective, legitimate government presence into 40,020 villages for the first time in modern Afghan history is the principle challenge, as government weakness, corruption, misrule and perceived lack of legitimacy at the village and district level allows militias, warlords and criminals to reassert themselves.

The notion of the “accidental guerrilla” and the de-emphasis of large-scale military operations has been recognised at the highest levels of the United States military. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen told the House Armed Services Committee in September 2008, “We can’t kill our way to victory...”. Admiral Mullen told the Committee that the U.S. urgently needed to improve its nation-building initiatives and its cross-border strategy with Pakistan.

In his own piece on “The Afghan Mistake” Sir Wellington Boote suggests that we should leave Afghanistan and leave “the savages in Afghanistan” to fall into their own heap. This sort of question is sometimes raised in relation to wars in faraway places, especially undeveloped ones that do not seem particularly relevant to us. My first response to that is that it strikes me as more than somewhat unseemly to invade another country and then depart when the locals fail to live up to our expectations.

There are three other reasons which might be more satisfying to people who consider that response a bit “soft”, three reasons firmly grounded in our self-interest. On a global basis, three major social evils are in large part the by-product of civil wars in which the locals are slugging it out – hard drugs, pandemic diseases and international terrorism:

- About 95% of the global production of illegal narcotics is located in civil war countries

- Epidemiological research suggests that the initial spread of HIV was closely associated with the 1979 civil war in Uganda

- International terrorists need areas outside of government control for large-scale training camps.

Sir Wellington asks whether you can have an alliance if you start saying “no”. My answer would be that indeed you can: that is what would make it an alliance rather than a client state relationship.

Finally, Sir Wellington also has some unkind things to say about “Canberra Public Servants”. I have known more than a few in my time. “Laziness” and “corruption” are not labels that I would apply to the people with whom I worked closely over many years.

Asylum seekers: how should we respond?

Regrettably the tragic explosion on an asylum seeker boat under tow to Christmas Island last week has caused the debate about asylum seeker policy to rear its ugly head again, with an obsessive focus on boat arrivals (most come by air).

In the course of this debate there was an item on ABC Radio National PM last Friday 17 April in which the Leader of the Opposition made some comments to which I feel it useful to respond.

I have no particular wish to attack Mr Turnbull. I am not interested in the politics of this matter, only with the issues and the outcomes, but his comments raise a number of important issues that require careful consideration.

First, to quote Mr Turnbull in full, as presented in the ABC’s transcript of the interview:

MALCOLM TURNBULL: The most significant change the Government made in August was to abandon the temporary protection visas, which were designed by the previous Coalition government to establish a real disincentive for unauthorised boat arrivals.

They abandoned our tough policies and there has been a dramatic increase in unauthorised boat arrivals. Clearly their policies are not working. You have to judge policies by their results. And the results are not good.

Too many unauthorised boat arrivals; too many lives being put at risk.

Regarding the content of Mr Turnbull’s remarks:

You have to judge policies by their results

Actually, the correct starting point for judging policies (any policies) is whether they are appropriate from a moral and ethical viewpoint – are they, dare I say it, honourable?

In parallel with that we must consider whether any proposed policy framework is legal, in two senses:

- Is it consistent with our domestic law? and

- Is it compliant with our international obligations as expressed in the treaties we have freely negotiated and signed (and which are often imported into our domestic law)?

Within the boundaries of an appropriate moral, ethical and legal framework we will normally have a wide range of policy choices that will enable our elected representatives to achieve the social and economic goals we set for ourselves.

I would argue that any policy for unauthorised boat arrivals that has as a deliberate aim of policy the treatment of one group of individuals by reference not to what they themselves have done but for the purpose of conditioning the behaviour of some other group of people fails utterly any test of being moral/ethical/honourable, and it probably falls down in relation to various aspects of human rights law as well.

Temporary protection visas ...were designed by the previous Coalition government to establish a real disincentive for unauthorised boat arrivals

Make no mistake about it, the Temporary Protection Visa (TPV) was designed to be a central plank of a platform which was intended to make Australia such an awful place in which to seek asylum that almost no-one would do it. Mandatory incarceration in remote locations where there would be no access to “bleeding-heart lawyers”, leading ultimately to the Pacific Solution, was another.

The TPV was a cynical and “clever” response to the proposition that asylum seekers come here because they fear for their safety. “They fear for their safety? OK, we’ll give them that and nothing else. We will provide them with their individual physical safety until it is safe for them to return whence they came and then we will send them back”. Their protection was stripped of all human content except their personal physical safety; they lived here in perpetual limbo – no right to work, no access to services, no right of family reunion.

Tough policies

Just to illustrate what the TPV meant, recall the tragic case of the Iraqi woman on board SIEV-X who lost her three daughters, drowned at sea, just three of the 353 lives lost on SIEV-X. She was attempting to make her way to Australia because her husband was here on a TPV but was not allowed to bring his family here. Let me spell it out: we had formally recognised the husband’s legal right to our protection, but would not allow him to bring his immediate family here. When his daughters drowned and his wife, having been rescued, was returned to Indonesia, the Government’s attitude remained that she could not come here. He was free to join his wife in Indonesia, they said, but then his TPV would lapse and he would not be permitted to return here. This kind of approach is what tough policies are all about. Tough policies affect individual people in tough ways.

Those who call for tough policies to deter “illegals” are curiously selective about the tough policies they want. I have never heard any of our political leaders call for such drastic sanctions against overstayers that no backpacker would ever risk overstaying his/her visa. But these are the real “illegals” – they have been granted time-limited access to Australia, it is a condition of the visa that they leave when their time is up, and only in exceptional circumstances would they have any claims on us regarding their personal safety if they were to return home.

This is also where the big numbers are – at the time when we were having great sound and fury about a few thousand unauthorised boat arrivals there were an estimated 54,000 overstayers, or thereabouts.

Too many lives being put at risk

There is no doubt that the people smugglers who organise this traffic are bad people. They are in it for the money, they prey on vulnerable people, they misrepresent to these people (downplay) the risks of the voyage and the reception they will receive when they get to Australia. In his book A Certain Maritime Incident: the sinking of SIEV-X Tony Kevin presents evidence that those who wanted to back out, having clapped eyes on the vessel in question, were forced on board at gunpoint. No doubt there are many other voyages on which there are passengers who have not been permitted to back out when they realised that they had been told a bunch of lies about the seaworthiness of the vessels they would be travelling on.

But let us not pretend that those who are fulminating about the increase in boat arrivals are primarily motivated by the welfare of the asylum seekers or the important general issue of Safety of Lives at Sea.

And let us not let our feelings about the asylum seekers be contaminated by our views about the people smugglers. Julian Burnside QC put it very eloquently in a letter to The Age on Saturday 18 April:

No one imagines that people smugglers are angels. Some – perhaps most – are mercenary and callous. But those who place their lives in the hands of people smugglers do so for fear of greater harm if they stay where they are.

As a result of the tough policies of the past we have many people amongst us who after a long period in mandatory detention were found to be genuine refugees, and who might once have made productive citizens, but who are now broken people.

At the conclusion of a high level meeting on this issue in the late 1990s a very senior person remarked to me, ”Every time one of these people says the magic words ‘I am a refugee’ it costs the Australian taxpayer an average of $65,000”.

My answer was, and remains, “And if you happened to be somewhere on the Northwest coast of Australia when a refugee boat made a landfall, and you watched these poor bedraggled people struggling ashore, and asked yourself the question ‘What would be the very best way we could spend $65,000 on each and every one of these people’, would you come up with the answer we have come up with?”